Right Tool, Wrong Parameters: Defending LLM Agents Against Parameter Poisoning

Reported by arXiv cs.CR (Yao Wang, Zehua Ma, Weiming Zhang, Han Fang)

Summary by Cyber Security News4 Nov 2026, 06:00 CET

About this summary. This is a short excerpt from the description that arXiv cs.CR published with its article. Cyber Security News did not report or verify the underlying story. Read the original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04673

arXiv:2611.04673v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) poses a critical threat to LLM agents. Existing defenses largely focus on whether an injection induces a new tool invocation or unintended action. In this paper, we study a different attack surface, parameter poisoning, where the attacker preserves the intended action but manipulates one or more tool arguments, such as a recipient or other task-critical value.

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