AgentCap: Capability-Based Runtime Authorization for Secure LLM Agent Execution

Reported by arXiv cs.CR (Aravinda Kashyap Kabbinamakki Suresh, Peng Gao)

Summary by Cyber Security News3 Nov 2026, 06:00 CET

About this summary. This is a short excerpt from the description that arXiv cs.CR published with its article. Cyber Security News did not report or verify the underlying story. Read the original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00729

arXiv:2611.00729v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language-model agents commonly collapse two decisions that security systems separate: selecting an action and determining whether that action is authorized. When a model exercises standing authority, indirect prompt injection can convert influence over its reasoning into unauthorized effects.

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR →

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