Blindfold: Keeping the Audit Coin Secret from LLM Agents

Reported by arXiv cs.CR (Wei Zhu, Meiyun Zuo, Huiping Sun)

Summary by Cyber Security News28 Oct 2026, 05:00 CET

About this summary. This is a short excerpt from the description that arXiv cs.CR published with its article. Cyber Security News did not report or verify the underlying story. Read the original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37055

arXiv:2610.37055v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Audit-based certification bounds the violation rate of an LLM agent by auditing a random fraction $\varepsilon$ of actions and reweighting the audited labels; its validity is meant to rest only on the defender's audit coin. We show that it also rests on a confidentiality property: the coin must not interfere with the agent's view before the action commits, at a time the agent chooses.

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