Beyond Instruction Override: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection with Task-Tampering Attacks

Reported by arXiv cs.CR (Rongting Zhang, Martin Bertran, Sandeep Avula, Chia-Jung Lee, Vanessa Murdock)

Summary by Cyber Security News6 Nov 2026, 06:00 CET

About this summary. This is a short excerpt from the description that arXiv cs.CR published with its article. Cyber Security News did not report or verify the underlying story. Read the original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07640

arXiv:2611.07640v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Indirect prompt-injection (IPI) benchmarks predominantly test planted instructions that redirect a tool-using agent toward an attacker-chosen task. Yet attacker-controlled content can instead tamper with the outcome of the task already in progress. A buyer's dispute evidence can cite a false refund policy to inflate a refund without changing the task.

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR →

Source attribution: headline and facts are from arXiv cs.CR (arxiv.org). Summary method: excerpt of the source description. See our source attribution policy.

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