arXiv:2611.15472v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Signed PDF documents have legally binding value under frameworks such as the EU's eIDAS regulation. In this work, we present Genuine PDF Forgeries, a novel attack class that focuses on human factors in signature validation. Our attacks target the disconnect between cryptographically verifiable signer certificates and human-visible signature blocks embedded in documents.
What You See Is (Not) What You Got: The Human Factor in PDF Signature Verification
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