arXiv:2609.38224v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model agents are increasingly granted real privileges (executing commands, modifying files, calling APIs), so an agent that errs has already acted. Existing defences concentrate on the agent's inputs, while the path from a candidate action to privileged side effects remains less directly studied.
Separation of Duties for Privileged LLM Agents: A Governed Execution Architecture with Measured Security-Utility Trade-offs
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