arXiv:2611.03772v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Third-party Agent Skills extend what an autonomous agent can do, but a malicious Skill can hide data exposure or output manipulation inside a legitimate workflow. Neither reading a Skill's description nor granting it tool permissions tells whether its execution meets the user's security requirements. We introduce RuntimeTickets, a protocol that enforces and audits these requirements while a Skill runs.
RuntimeTickets: Source-Grounded Security Obligations for Agent Skills
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