Robust & Scalable Website Fingerprinting via Minimal DRAM Traffic

Reported by arXiv cs.CR (Shubham Roy, Samar Parwez, Biswabandan Panda)

Summary by Cyber Security News9 Nov 2026, 06:00 CET

About this summary. This is a short excerpt from the description that arXiv cs.CR published with its article. Cyber Security News did not report or verify the underlying story. Read the original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09422

arXiv:2611.09422v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Website fingerprinting attacks infer websites visited by users and threaten their privacy. These attacks are classified as on-path, which monitor network traffic, and co-located, which exploit shared system resources. Existing co-located attacks, such as sweep-counting and loop-counting, achieve over 90% accuracy but suffer significant performance degradation on many-core systems.

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR →

Source attribution: headline and facts are from arXiv cs.CR (arxiv.org). Summary method: excerpt of the source description. See our source attribution policy.

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