Provable Subexponential Algorithms for NIST Third-Round Lattice Families

Reported by arXiv cs.CR (Yiming Gao, Xuyuan Han, Honggang Hu)

Summary by Cyber Security News9 Oct 2026, 06:00 CEST

About this summary. This is a short, independently written summary of an article first published by arXiv cs.CR. Cyber Security News did not report or verify the underlying story. Read the original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11254

arXiv:2610.11254v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We give provable classical subexponential algorithms for secret recovery in growing parameter families associated with NIST third-round lattice candidates. For the Kyber/ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, SABER, NTRU LPRime, and Dilithium/ML-DSA families studied here, polynomial moduli and polylogarithmic coefficient scales yield recovery of the short secret component in expected time and space $2^{(1/2+o(1))n/\ln\ln n}$.

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