Ivan Milenkovic, VP Risk Technology EMEA at Qualys, explains how security leaders can build an economic model that puts money behind their decisions. He suggests starting with a few loss scenarios, then working down to the assets that drive them. He covers how to rank fixes by value at risk, what CFOs expect to see, and how to show the worth of incidents that never happened.
Pricing your bad days and how to build an economic model for security decisions
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