Package Hallucination Attacks on Coding Agents through Prompt Injection in Rule Files

Reported by arXiv cs.CR (Yupu Wang, Zhengyuan Jiang, Reachal Wang, Neil Zhenqiang Gong)

Summary by Cyber Security News8 Oct 2026, 06:00 CEST

About this summary. This is a short, independently written summary of an article first published by arXiv cs.CR. Cyber Security News did not report or verify the underlying story. Read the original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09264

arXiv:2610.09264v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agentic coding frameworks increasingly rely on community-shared rule files (e.g., AGENTS.md or .cursorrules) to guide autonomous code generation, yet the security risks of this pipeline remain underexplored.

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR →

Source attribution: headline and facts are from arXiv cs.CR (arxiv.org). Summary method: excerpt of the source description. See our source attribution policy.

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