Intent-Hiding Jailbreaks: An Information-Theoretic Framework for Compositional Attacks

Reported by arXiv cs.CR (Fengwei Tian, Ravi Tandon)

Summary by Cyber Security News5 Oct 2026, 06:00 CET

About this summary. This is a short excerpt from the description that arXiv cs.CR published with its article. Cyber Security News did not report or verify the underlying story. Read the original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02302

arXiv:2610.02302v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work has shown that large language models (LLMs) can be vulnerable to jailbreak attacks in which harmful intent is obscured through composition with benign tasks. A harmful request refused in isolation may elicit a different response when embedded within a larger, seemingly benign query. We study these compositional intent-hiding jailbreaks from an information-theoretic perspective.

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